THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
It is unfortunate that the Illinois court in the instant case followed the dictates of
stare decisis.13 Probably the only solution now lies in recourse to the legislature, a
step which has already been taken by several states.14

Conflict of Laws-Civil Death-Application of Local Penalty to Conviction in Another
State-[Federall.-The plaintiff was sentenced in Florida to life imprisonment for
murder. Having been paroled, he brought suit in a federal court in New York on a
tort claim arising in New York. The sole question was whether § 51i of the Penal Law
of New York,' which states that "a person sentenced to imprisonment for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead," prevented the plaintiff from suing. Held, that the New
York statute was not applicable to a person sentenced to life imprisonment in another
state. Panko v. Edicott Johnson Corporation.2
The restriction placed upon the application of the New York statute in the instant
case is in accord with the tendency to mitigate the harshness of common law civil
death.s This policy has reduced the effect of civil death in New York to the dissolution of the marriage of the person sentenced,4 the loss of his political rights, and the
loss of his right to sue. But this latter vestige of common law civil death seems to be
without justification today.s It cannot be supported as a deterrent to crime. It may
-3 For cases holding that the de jure officer may not recover salary from a city after it has
already been paid to the de facto incumbent see: People ex rel. Sartisan v. Schmidt, 281 Ill.
21X, 117

N.E. 1037 (1917); People ex rel. Durante v. Burdett, 283 Ill.
124, ii8 N.E. ioo9

(i918); Hittell v. Chicago, 327 Ill.
443, 158 N.E. 683 (1927). Two widely cited cases have held
that the de jure officer may recover from the de facto officer the salary the latter has received:
Mayfield v.Moore, 53 Ill.
428 (1870); Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill.
496, 36 N.E. 983 (1894).
14See Cal. Pol. Code 1937, § 936, 7; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1929, § 11423.
1 Cahill's Cons. L. of New York i93o, c.

41,

§ 511.

F. Supp. 678 (N.Y. 1938).
3Strict common law civil death which resulted only from profession in religion, abjuration
of the realm, and banishment from the realm, had practically the same effect on one's legal
rights as natural death. Co. Litt.* I33a (§ 200); 2 Woerner, Administration 699 note ii (3 d
ed. 1923). Civil death following attainder for treason or felony had less radical consequences.
It resulted primarily in the loss of political rights, such as the right to vote or hold office, and
in the loss of the right to sue and to be a witness. i Chitty, Criminal Law 723 (2d ed. 1826);
3 Coke, Institutes 215 (,797). It is this milder form which the New York courts have held to
be the pattern of civil death in that state. New York statutes abolishing disqualification of a
person sentenced to life imprisonment as a witness and providing the appointment of a committee to manage the real and personal estate of a life convict have further abated the rigour
of the early form of civil death.
4 Avery v. Everett, iio N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (i888); Gargan v. Sculley, 82 Misc. 667, 144
N.Y. Supp. 205 (1913); Glielmi v. Glielmi, 72 Misc. 51I, 31 N.Y. Supp. 373 (i9ii).
sBefore the abolition of forfeiture and corruption of blood, the suspension of the right to sue
might have been supported on the ground that a person convicted of a felony could not be a
party in any action as a consequence of the forfeiture of his estate and the corruption of his
blood.
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give a windfall to debtors, and it may inflict an unmerited punishment on innocent
third persons,6 namely, on the dependents of the person sentenced and his heirs.7
This savors of forfeiture and corruption of blood which have long been prohibited in
New York. 8
The disfavor with which the courts regard the suspension of the right to sue is
manifested by their tendency to restrict its application.9 In following this tendency
the court has a sound basis on which to stand. Because it deprives a person of a
civil right which he previously possessed, the civil death statute is in effect a penal
law."z A penal statute will not be applied, even by the courts of the state in which
it is enacted, to an act taking place wholly in another state."' Furthermore, the strictness with which penal statutes are ordinarily construed" prevents the application of
such a statute to a situation which, like that in the instant case, does not unequivocally
come within its terms.z3 Finally, a sentence to imprisonment under the laws of one
state can have no effect by way of penalty or disability, beyond the limits of the state
in which the judgment is rendered, in the absence of an express statute in another state
giving effect to such sentence.14 The decision is also consistent with the general
6As a reason for confining the application of infamy statutes, Beale suggested an analogous
argument, namely, that they inflict an unmerited punishment on third persons-those who need
the convict's testimony. Beale, Progress of the Law, 1919-20, 34 Harv. L.Rev. 5o, 62 (192o).
The force of this argument is greater in other states than New York because New York
has provided by statute for the appointment of a committee to manage the real and personal
property of life convicts. Cahil's Cons. L. of New York, c. iob, §§ 320, 321 (2d ed. 193o).
The cases do not indicate what effect this provision has on the right to sue.
8They were abolished by the legislative act of the 26th of March, 1796, Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 18 (1822). See Cahill's Cons. L. of New York, c. 41, § 512 (2d ed.
X930).
9A life convict in New York has been allowed to sue the state for tort injuries suffered in
prison work. Bhullar v. State, 248 App. Div. 802, 289 N.Y. Supp. 41 (936). If a plaintiff has
instituted suit, and is then convicted and sentenced, he is entitled to go on with his action.
Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246 (1884).
"0Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892); Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall.
(U.S.) 277 (i866); Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246 (1884); Beale, The Progress of the Law,
1919-1920, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 50, 62 (1920).
11 1 Wharton, Conflict of Laws 20 (3d ed. i9o5). In State v. Knight, i Taylor (N.C.) z43
(1799), the court expressly declared "one state cannot punish crimes committed in another
state." For a thorough discussion of the considerations involved in the application of the
principle stated, see Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Law i-8 (1936); see also Stumberg, Conffict of Laws 53, note 5 (I937).
12 Doubts as to correct interpretation of penal statutes are resolved in favor of the accused.
People v. Mangan, 262 N.Y. 5o8, 188 N.E. 41 (1933).
13 For examples of strict construction, see the cases holding that statutes providing special
consequences for a sentence "to imprisonment in the state courts" do not apply to a sentence

to imprisonment in the reformatory, Sample v. Homer, 6z Kan. 738, 6o Pac. 745 (19oo), or
to a sentence in the county penitentiary, Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246 (1884), and not
even to sentences in the federal courts, Presbury v. Hull, 34 Mo. 29 (x863).
'4 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515
(1822); Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466 (878); People v. Gutterson, 244 N.Y. 243, 155 N.E. 113
(1926).
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treatment of analogous statutes attaching special disabilities to a sentence of imprisonment.'s It may finally be justified by the consideration that a state may be
unwilling to attach penal consequences to a judgment rendered in proceedings, the
fairness of which it cannot control.
The court held correctly that Jones v. Jones,16 on which the defendant relied for
applying the statute to the plaintiff, was distinguishable from the instant case. The
Jones case held that a statute providing that a second marriage was not void if contracted after the first spouse had been finally sentenced to life imprisonment was
applicable to a sentence in a foreign jurisdiction. But the decision was motivated by
a desire to liberate the spouse of the person sentenced and was not intended to provide
an additional penalty.

Conflict of Laws-Divorces Entitled to Full Faith and Credit- Qualification of
Haddock Case-[Federal].-In 1925 the District Court of the District of Columbia
granted the plaintiff a separation from the defendant, his wife, on ground of the latter's
cruelty. In 1929 the plaintiff started suit in Virginia to secure an absolute divorce
on the ground of desertion, the defendant being personally served in the District of
Columbia. The defendant appeared specially and unsuccessfully contested the
plaintiff's Virginia domicile. Upon the defendant's failure to plead to the merits within
a ten-day period granted by the court, the case proceeded to judgment for the plaintiff.
The husband, the plaintiff, remarried in x933, and in 1935 sought to set aside the 1925
decree for separate maintenance and to get recognition of the Virginia decree. Held,
that the defendant could not relitigate the good faith of the plaintiff's Virginia domicile, and also that the Virginia decree was entitled to recognition in the District of
Columbia. Davis v. Davis.,
The holding that the Virginia court's decision as to the husband's Virginia domicile
was to be regarded as resjudicatain the principal case is discussed in connection with
a separate note in this Review.2 This note deals with the question of the recognition
of the Virginia decree: Although a foreign divorce will not be recognized unless one
spouse at least be domiciled in the jurisdiction granting the divorce,3 according to the
is Among the analogous statutes which the courts have refused to apply to convictions or
sentences in a foreign jurisdiction are those providing that a conviction of a felony or sentence
to imprisonment shall be a ground for divorce, Leonard v. Leonard, ii Mass. 151, 23 N.E.
732 (i8go), or shall result in disbarment as an attorney, it re Ebbs, iSo N.C. 4o, 63 S.E. x9o
(x9o8), or in disqualification as an executor, In re Cohen's Will, 164 Misc. 98, 298 N.Y. Supp.
368 (r937), or in increased punishment for subsequent crimes, People v. Gutterson, 244 N.Y.
243, 155 N.E. 113 (1926), or in disqualification as a witness, Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466 (1878),
Logan v. United States, i44 U.S. 263 (1892).
16249 App. Div. 470, 292 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1937), aff'd without opinion, 274 N.Y. 574, io
N.E. (2d) 558 (1937)-

' 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938). The decision arose from the repeated refusal of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia to recognize the Virginia divorce: 57 F. (2d) 414 (App. D.C.
1932), and 96 F. (2d) 512 (App. D.C. 1938).
6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 293 (1939).
3Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903).

